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and the War Crime of
Disproportionate Force Not
Justified By Military Necessity
Mbori Otieno,* Emmah Wabuke,** and Smith Otieno***
Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are not disparate in
operation. There are several points of intersection in the two
concepts, commencing with the context in which they apply, and
further, in their interpretation of the general principles of
proportionality and necessity. Although proportionality connotes
divergent theoretical notions depending on the backdrop against
which it is set, in practice, these notions are often fused
together. However, points of fission (divergence) still persist.
The best example of which is in the context of ‘The Crime of
Disproportionate Use of Force’ where the difference between the
two notions of ‘proportionality’ can be described as the
limitations on the overall force used to respond to an armed
attack under jus ad bellum as opposed to the balance between
the anticipated military advantage weighed against the resulting
loss of civilian life under jus in bello. The authors argue that
there is need for fusion (convergence) between jus ad bellum
and jus in bello particularly in relation to modern war crimes
trials in order to ensure that both principles have practical
significance. This would ensure further convergence between jus
in bello and jus ad bellum. To fulfill the shielding purpose of law
in the context of armed conflict, more fusion between these two
concepts must be embraced in all fora, including,
conceptualization of crime of aggression and distinguishing
between combatants and civilians.
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I. Introduction
The cardinal principle governing jus in bello demands a
distinction between combatants and civilians and authorizes the
attack of the former. In essence, loss of civilian life is prohibited
unless it occurs within the context of the principles of necessity and
proportionality. In contrast, the cardinal principle governing jus ad
bellum is that States are not allowed to use force unless done in
individual or collective self-defense. Based on the foregoing, then, two
questions arise. First, can the use of force in wars of aggression be
prosecuted as the war crime of disproportionate force not justified by
military necessity? Second, do the principles of proportionality and
necessity play an extended role where jus ad bellum has been
observed, hence creating a wider justification to an eventuality of loss
of civilian life or negating lawful use of force to unlawful use not
justified by any military necessity?
Prior to the development of modern international law and the
advent of the League of Nations and the United Nations, the legal
rules that governed the use of force by nations were derived solely
from the norms of customary international law. These were norms
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that would arise from the convergence of general and consistent State
practice and opinio juris.1 Early attempts at developing a concrete
and binding legal statement on the prohibition of the use of armed
force through multilateral treaties such as the Covenant of the League
of Nations,2 and the Kellogg-Briand Pact3 proved ineffective and were
ultimately replaced by the United Nations Charter.
In this regard, the authors posit that there is need for fusion
(convergence) between jus ad bellum and jus in bello particularly in
relation to modern war crimes trials in order to ensure that both
principles have practical significance. The principles of proportionality
and necessity as used in jus ad bellum and as used in jus in bello can
be fused for practical significance and to bolster the position of jus ad
bellum and jus in bello in enforcement of international criminal law.
The authors argue that in the assessment of proportionality and
necessity under jus in bello, international tribunals can, and have in
the past, considered proportionality and necessity in jus ad bellum.
This makes the case for the fusion of the concepts in the unlawful use
of force vis-à-vis the war crime disproportionate use of force, not
justified by military necessity.
For easier comprehension, the authors have divided the essay into
three broad parts: Part I assesses jus ad bellum in a generic sense and
its relationship to the cases of disproportionate use of force as viewed
from a jus ad bellum point of view. Part II then addresses the points
of fission (divergence) and fusion (convergence) between jus ad bellum
and jus in bello. Here the authors do not attempt any arguments on
whether there should be any kind of fission or fusion between the two
1.

MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 73 (6th ed. 2008); JOHN H.
CURRIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND THEORY
120-44 (2007).

2.

Covenant of the League of Nations art. 12, June 28, 1919, 225 Consol.
T.S. 188, available at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/leagcov.asp#art12
[http://perma.cc/S7PK-VS2R] (“The Members of the League agree
that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a
rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial
settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to
resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or
the judicial decision, or the report by the Council. In any case under
this Article the award of the arbitrators or the judicial decision shall be
made within a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be
made within six months after the submission of the dispute.”).

3.

Kellogg-Briand Pact art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S.
57, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/kbpact.htm
[http://perma.cc/78S2-TGJ6] (“The High Contracting Parties solemnly
declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn
recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and
renounce it, as an instrument of national policy in their relations with
one another.”).
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broad parts. Part III then endeavors to argue for the construction of
more fission between the two areas of law using the war crime of
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity as a
backdrop. The last part in this section seeks to draw a case for more
fusion by using the dichotomy of combatants and civilians in jus in
bello and jus ad bellum as a focus area. In this part the authors argue
for a convergence of the two broad concepts of international law for
morally justifiable outcomes. This is done with the background
understanding that the two concepts are currently viewed as
divergent when it comes to enforcement under international criminal
law.
A. Unlawful Use of Force: Assessing Jus Ad Bellum
1. Introduction

While the most common starting point in the assessment of the
modern unlawful use of force is the United Nations Charter, the idea
of a “just war” is in essence a transformation of older ideas.
Two Catholic saints, Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are credited
with formulation of a “just war” doctrine.4 This doctrine is
characterized by three main principles: the authoritativeness of the
initiator of war, just reasons for waging war, and the legitimate
intentions of war.5 Due to obvious ties of the foregoing writers to the
Church, this viewpoint was characteristically founded on natural law.6
Although this doctrine has been expanded numerously in
subsequent years, the cardinal principles have been maintained, as
evidenced by the relevant provisions in the United Nations Charter.7
Article 2(4) of the Charter contains the general proscription
against the use of force: “[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial sovereignty or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.8“
This provision is couched in mandatory terms, exposing the
seriousness in which the concept of jus ad bellum is regarded.
However, Article 51 of the UN Charter then contains a limited
exception to the general prohibition on the use of force:
4.

Sheng Hongsheng, The Evolution of Law of War, 1 CHINESE J. INT’L
POL. 267, 267-301 (2006).

5.

GU DEXIN, ZHAN ZHENG XIN LUN [NEW THEORY OF WAR] 48 (1990);
Peter Haggenmacher, Just War and Regular War in Sixteenth Century
Spanish Doctrine, 32 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 434, 436 (1992).

6.

See LI JIASHAN, GUO JI FA XUE SHI XIN LUN [NEW COMMENT ON
HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THEORY] 43 (1987).

7.

U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 1.

8.

Id. at art. 2, ¶ 4.
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise
of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority
and responsibility of the Security Council under the present
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in
order to maintain or restore international peace and security…9

This article, therefore, provides for the permissible cases when a
State may use armed force, that is, in situations of individual or
collective self-defense. However, there is a caveat attached: there must
be a United Nations Security Council Resolution supporting this
action. Thus, the assumption here is that when a State takes up arms
against another State or entity, said State or entity will be acting in
violation of the rule prohibiting the resort to force in international law
embedded in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. This serious violation
found in Article 2(4) is termed aggression.10 The entity who violates
this provision against a State would therefore be an aggressor under
international law. For purposes of this article, the party that is
subject to the aggression will be referred to as the “self-defending
State or entity.”
Therefore, what is referred to as unlawful use of force is really the
violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. If States or non-State
entities resort to use of force other than as authorized under the UN
Charter, that use of force is unlawful under international law. This
means that while the general rule seems to be founded on the
prohibition of the use of force, the use of force in international
relations is not unlawful, except as authorized by the United Nations
Charter. Despite this sense of general prohibition on the resort to the
use of force in the UN Charter, conflict and hostilities that involve the
use of armed force remain constant features of the international
politics.11

9.

Id. at art. 51.

10.

U.N. Charter, supra note 7, at art. 2, ¶ 4. While it seems easy enough,
the definition of aggression has been the source of a huge struggle over
the years in international relations and politics. Recently in 2010 an
amendment has been proposed to the Statute of the International Court
of Justice including aggression as an international crime to be recognized
by the International Criminal Court (addressed in Part III). See
Assembly of States Parties, Res. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010).

11.

Elihu Lauterpacht, The Legal Irrelevance of the “State of War”, 62 AM.
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 58, 59 (1968).
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From this general principle on jus ad bellum four legal
consequences come to bear. The first being that what was previously
a legal status of a “declaration of war”12 no longer exists. States can
no longer avail themselves to what was previously known as
“belligerent rights.” These rights include “the seizure of enemy ship or
other property at sea or on land under the law of naval warfare, the
law of land warfare, and the trading with the enemy legislation, as
well as rights of visit, search, and seizure exercised with respect to
neutral merchant shipping.”13
The second is that the law of neutrality has been placed within
new confines, although not eliminated entirely. One State may assist
another State, but only when that State is acting within the confines
of the law, for example when acting in individual or collective selfdefense.14 Previously, there was an obligation for third parties to
remain neutral, refrain from assisting belligerents, and to treat
combatants neutrally.
The third is that a State that employs force unlawfully cannot
validly secure sovereignty over territory captured during war. Fourth,
and lastly, the use of force by the State acting lawfully must be
proportionate to the degree of force employed against it.15 This fourth
consequence of the unlawful use of force is linked to the jus in bello
crime of disproportionate use of force not justified by military
necessity. This is the limb on which this essay attempts to focus.
While the norm prohibiting the use of force in Article 2(4) of the
UN Charter was previously envisioned to be binding as against
member States of the UN only, the norm has crystallized into what is
known as a peremptory norm of international law or jus cogens
norm.16 This is defined as “a norm accepted and recognized by the
international community of States as a whole as a norm from which
12.

See id. (explaining that the term “war” refers to a narrow legal and
technical situation which begins with a declaration of war and ends with
a peace treaty).

13.

Richard R. Baxter et al., The Legal Consequences of the Unlawful Use
of Force Under the Charter, 62 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 68, 68-9
(1968).

14.

IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES
402-04 (1963).

15.

See Richard A. Falk, International Law and the United States Role in
the Viet Nam War, 75 YALE L.J. 1122, 1144 (1966) (“Elementary
principles of . . . international law require that force legitimately used
must be . . . somewhat proportional to the provocation.”).

16.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, 100 ¶ 190 (June 27) (indicating
that the I.C.J. has regarded the prohibition of the use of force as being a
conspicuous example of a rule of international law having the character
of jus cogens).

308

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
The Fission and Fusion in International Use of Force

no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”17 Since jus cogens is part of international customary law,
it is legally binding for all members of the international community,
regardless of whether they have expressed their approval or
disapproval of a particular norm or not.18 The violation of jus cogens
norms creates a right for any State in the international community to
seek redress because the obligation that these norms create is held as
against the entire international community (erga omnes).19
2. Unlawful use of force in jus ad bellum: The Case of Disproportionate
Use of Force

As stated in the previous section, one of the consequences of the
general principle on the prohibition of the use of force is that a lawful
act of self-defense might be negated and made unlawful if it is
disproportionate to the aggressor’s initial attack. Thus, in jus ad
bellum the use of force in self-defense must be strictly confined to a
set defensive objective.20 Under jus ad bellum, proportionality is
applicable to any use of force, be it legally controversial, such as in
humanitarian interventions,21 or in instances of legitimate use of force
authorized by the UN Security Council (UNSC).22 The principle of
17.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (It is important to stress here however, that the definition
is given in the context of the law of treaties and explains the term by
effect of these norms as being non-derogable by a treaty. But at the
same time, this definition has also been adopted to general international
law and has been used outside the field of the law of treaties.).

18.

See Rudolf Bernhardt, Customary International Law, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 898, 904 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992)
(“[I]t remains doubtful . . . how long an objector can remain outside the
binding force of customary norms.”).
OF

19.

See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A.
Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83, at art. 48 (Jan. 28, 2002)
(explaining that rights created by jus cogens norms); See Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Co., Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. 1, ¶
33 (Feb. 5) (clarifying obligations under erga omnes).

20.

Dapo Akande, Nuclear Weapons, Unclear Law? Deciphering the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion of the International Court, 68 BRIT. Y.B.
INT’L L 165, 191 (1997).

21.

See Christine M. Chinkin, Kosovo: A “Good” or “Bad” War? 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 841, 844 (1999); see also Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 834, 839
(1999).

22.

See THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 631 (Bruno
Simma et al eds., 3rd ed. 1994) (illustrating that in this case,
proportionality would be measured between the UNSC military action
and the general objective that this action is authorized to pursue
according to the relevant UNSC resolution).
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proportionality is well established in self-defense by States both in
State practice23 and case law.24
3. Unlawful use of force in jus in bello: The Case of Disproportionate Use
of Force

There are certain principles that underlie the law of armed
conflict and must be observed during the occurrence of any type of
armed conflict. These principles are especially important as gap fillers
when no specific rule governs a certain situation. The traditional
approach was anchored on three principles: 1) military necessity, 2)
humanity, and 3) chivalry.25
The principle of military necessity enables a belligerent to apply
compulsion and force of any kind to the extent necessary to realize
the purpose of the war. This concept presupposes controlled force and
that the force is necessary to achieve, as quickly as possible, the
partial or complete submission of the enemy with the least possible
expenditure of lives, resources, and money.26 The principle of
humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or destruction not
actually necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military
purposes. This principle confirms the now celebrated principle of
distinction, which provides for the basic immunity of civilian persons
and property from being attacked during an armed conflict. The
principle of chivalry refers to the conduct in armed conflicts where
certain recognized formalities and courtesies were observed. These
formalities included, for example, the prohibitions against
23.

The following States have made similar statements, see Russia (UN Doc
S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 7); Qatar (UN Doc S/PV.5493, 21 July 2006,
14); China (UN Doc S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 11); Japan (UN Doc
S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 12); France (UN Doc S/PV.5493 (Resumption
1), 21 July 2006, 11); Slovakia (UN Doc S/PV.5493, 21 July 2006, 19);
Finland (UN Doc S/PV.5493 (Resumption I), 21 July 2006, 16); Greece
(UN Doc S/PV.5489, 14 July 2006, 17 and (UN Doc S/PV.5493
Resumption 1), 21 July 2006, 3); See also (UN Doc S/PV. 1320, 16 Nov.
1966, 19) (providing state reactions to military actions conducted by
Israel in the past and, in particular, statements in relation to the 1966
Israeli intervention in Jordan of the United Kingdom).

24.

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. V.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 237 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua v
U.S.]; Oil Platforms (Iran v US), Judgment, 2003 I.C.J. ¶ 76-77 (Nov.
6); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. ¶ 147 (Dec.
19).

25.

William J. Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 93 (1982).

26.

See Robert W. Gehring, Loss of Civilian Protections under the Fourth
Geneva Convention and Protocol I, 90 MIL. L. REV. 49, 54-58 (1980)
(explaining the implications of the principle of military necessity).

310

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016)
The Fission and Fusion in International Use of Force

dishonorable or treacherous conduct and against the misuse of enemy
uniforms or flags of truce.27 The days of gentlemanly warfare are long
gone, however, and only small vestiges of this principle remain.
The balance between the principle of military necessity and that
of humanity then bears upon the principle of proportionality. A
military commander is not allowed to cause collateral injury to
noncombatants or damage to civilian objects that is disproportionate
to the military advantage derived from an operation.28
In jus in bello the analysis is based on the incidental loss of
civilian life. Proportionality is referred to here in both legal
literature,29 as well as international case law,30 in relation to civilians
and civilian objects, as requiring that attacks do not cause excessive
damage to the latter in comparison with the direct and concrete
military advantage anticipated from attacks. Launching an attack
that may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination of both, and
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated, is prohibited under jus in bello.31
4. Conclusion

From the latter analysis we see that the principle of
proportionality plays an important role in the laws of armed conflict.
In jus ad bellum it gauges the lawfulness of the strategic goals in the
use of force for self-defense, and in jus in bello it gauges the lawfulness
of any armed attack that causes civilian casualties.
B. Points of Fusion: Proportionality Under jus in bello and jus ad bellum
1. Introduction

The most obvious point of fusion between the two notions is the
similarity in their field of application. Both notions govern the area of
27.

HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 227 (7th ed.
1952).

28.

Fenrick, supra note 25.

29.

Henri Meyrowitz, The Principle of Superfluous Injury or Unnecessary
Suffering 34 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 98, 109-10 (1994); Hamutal Esther
Shamash, How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of
Jus in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. R. 103, 104 (2006);
Bernard L. Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian
Law of Warfare: Recent Efforts at Codification 10 CORNELL INT’L L. J.
134, 134 (1977).

30.

Prosecutor v Gotovina and Others, Case No. IT-06-90-T, Judgment, ¶¶
1171, 1172, 1183, 1191 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia
Apr. 15, 2011); Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT-98-29-A. Judgment, ¶
190 (Int’l Crim. Trib. For the former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006).

31.

Akande, supra 20, at 209.
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armed conflict, with both trying to act as restraints upon activity
that would be considered legally unjustified. It is well settled for jus
in bello, for instance, that the means and methods of warfare are not
unlimited.32 Proportionality under jus ad bellum also has a restraining
role in the conduct of hostilities as the self-defending State has to
consider the following factors: damage caused to the aggressor State
by the defending action, the means used by the State acting in selfdefense, and the duration of the whole military operation.33
The other point of fusion is the balancing nature that each notion
requires and the factors that are to be considered when such analysis
is being undertaken. Indeed, the two notions of proportionality do not
actually require striking a balance between two similar quantities, as
any proportionate balance normally does. Rather, they require putting
an action in relation to its aim; this action, which includes the
damage that it causes, is required not to exceed what is necessary to
achieve the intended aim. Basically, this is a teleological balance
exercise, which results from the application of a necessity test. In this
sense, the two notions of proportionality have a close relationship
with necessity.34
2. The Fission: The Crime of Disproportionate Use of Force Not Justified
By Military Necessity

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
defines war crimes as, inter alia, “serious violations of the laws and
customs applicable in international armed conflict” and “serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in an armed conflict not
of an international character.”35 In relation to proportionality, the
ICC Statute defines a war crime as the act of:
intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects…. Which would be clearly excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage
anticipated.36

32.

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts,
art. 35, July 8, 1977, 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
Protocol I].

33.

Nicaragua v U.S., supra note 24, at ¶ 237.

34.

Raphael van Steenberghe, Proportionality under Jus ad bellum and Jus
in bello: Clarifying their Relationship, 45 ISR. L. REV. 107, 113 (2012).

35.

Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter ICC].

36.

Id. at art. 8(2)(b)(iv).
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This principle is anchored on the “fundamental principle that
belligerents do not enjoy an unlimited choice of means to inflict
damage on the enemy.”37 Proportionality under jus in bello is
measured by reference to the “immediate aims” of each single military
attack, rather than the “ultimate goals” of the broader military
action.38
The difference between the two ‘proportionality principles’ can be
described as the limitations on the overall force used to respond to the
grievance under jus ad bellum as opposed to the balance between the
anticipated military advantage of attacking a particular objective,
weighed against the resulting loss of civilian life under jus in bello.39
Steenberghe refers to this distinction as the “general vs. particular
dichotomy.”40 The two notions also have a fission of foundational
logic. While the proportionality requirement in jus ad bellum is based
on a superior right of the attacked State in regard to the attacker, the
legal regulation of the means and methods of warfare is dominated by
the principle of the parity of the belligerents and by the concomitant
principle of the respect owed by each of them to the interests and
values of a humanitarian nature.41
While in theory both notions seem to be distinct, in practice the
two proportionality principles are often merged.42 In applying the
proportionality principle in jus ad bellum, one would have to analyze
the choice of weaponry, which then has implications for jus in bello.43
On the contrary, Gardam argues that the proportionality requirement
in jus ad bellum has no humanitarian content: “it was traditionally
related exclusively to limitations on the damage of the territory of a
state and of third states.”44 This paper specifically refutes this
37.

Judith Gardam, Proportionality and Force in International Law 87, AM.
J. INT’L L. 391, 391 (1993).

38.

Jasmine Moussa, Can Jus ad Bellum Override Jus in Bello? Reaffirming
the Separation of the Two Bodies of Law, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 963,
976 (2008).

39.

Gardam, supra note 38.

40.

See van Steesnberghe, supra note 35, at 115.

41.

Enzo Canizzaro, Contextualising Proportionality: Jus ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello in the Lebanese War, 88: 864 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 779, 782
(2006).

42.

Id. at 781.

43.

Christopher Greenwood, Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 258
(Laurence Boisson de Chazournes et al eds., 1999).

44.

Judith Gardam, Necessity and Proportionality in Jus ad Bellum and Jus
in Bello, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 258 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes
et al eds., 1999).
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argument as it has negative implications for deterring the arbitrary
loss of civilian life, which is considered an important goal in the
theatre of war.
C. Constructing a Fusion: The Crime of Disproportionate Use of Force
not justified by Military Necessity
1. Conceptualizing the Crime of Aggression

While under jus in bello certain grave violations of the Geneva
Conventions, the Additional Protocols, and further the violation of
the proportionality requirement in Article 8(2)(b)(iv) can be
prosecuted as war crimes. The unlawful use of force that violates the
proportionality requirement in jus ad bellum cannot be prosecuted as
such. This problem is compounded by the fact that defining
aggression, which is the precursor of a self-defending action from
another State, has been highly controversial since day one of the
negotiations that culminated in the adoption of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC Statute) by the Rome Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1998.45 Two contentious issues arose
in the discussions on the crime of aggression: 1) how was State action
going to be translated to individual liability; and 2) what was the role
to be afforded to the United Nations Security Council as a filter for
prosecutions of the crime of aggression.46
The crime of aggression was included in the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the ICC,47 but the competence of the ICC to prosecute
aggression was made subject to the adoption of a definition of the
crime and the circumstances under which the ICC could exercise
jurisdiction.48 Following years of intensive deliberations and
negotiations, the matter was finally settled by the Review Conference
of the International Criminal Court that was held in Kampala,
Uganda on May 31 through June 11, 2010. The definition of the crime
of aggression by an individual is based on an act of aggression
committed by a State.
The definition adopted in Kampala simply repeats the provisions
of the General Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14,
1974, dealing with acts of aggression.49 It defines aggression as the use
45.

Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L L. J. 161, 17071 (2008).

46.

See Silvia A. Fernandez de Gurmendi, The Working Group on
Aggression at the Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 589, 590 (2002).

47.

ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5(1)(d).

48.

ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5(2).

49.

G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N.
Doc. A/9631, at 142 (Dec. 14, 1974).
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of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this
definition, and then goes on to list a number of acts that constitute
acts of aggression. The crime of aggression was defined in Kampala by
general agreement, as “the planning, preparation, initiation or
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control over
or to direct the political or military action which, by its character,
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of
the United Nations.” The crime of aggression thus came to be defined
as (a) a leadership crime; (b) flowing forth from an act of aggression;
and (c) subject to U.N. Charter constraints.
The amendments to the ICC Statute approved by the Review
Conference will enter into force following ratification of the
amendments by no less than thirty States Parties. Furthermore,
implementation of the decisions taken in Kampala with respect to the
crime of aggression will be kept on ice until at least January 1, 2017,
after which a decision to implement the same must again be approved
by the same majority of States Parties required for amendments of
the ICC Statute. Although this outcome is in a sense disappointing,
the fact that nations of the world have now agreed on a definition of
aggression will most likely serve as a deterrent against unbecoming
military action by trigger-happy regimes.50 This outcome was neatly
encapsulated by Ambassador Stephen Rapp and Prof. Harold Koh,
the leading members of the American delegation as follows:
The court cannot exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
aggression without a further decision to take place sometime
after January 1, 2017. The prosecutor cannot charge nationals
of non-state parties, including the U.S. nationals, with the crime
of aggression. No U.S. national can be prosecuted for aggression
as long as the U.S. remains a non-state party. And if we were to
become a state party, we’d still have the option to opt out from
having our nationals prosecuted for aggression. So we ensure
total protection for our Armed Forces and other U.S. nationals
going forward.51

Without the ICC having jurisdiction to deal with the crime of
aggression today, it seems impossible to find ways of prosecution
individuals from aggressor States and self-defending States who use
50.

See Johan Van der Vyer, Prosecuting the Crime of Aggression in the
International Criminal Court, 1 U. MIAMI NAT’L SEC. & ARMED
CONFLICT L. REV. 1, 2 (2010) (discussing the consequences of entering
into force the ICC Statute that the Review Conference approved).

51.

Harold Koh, Legal Advisor U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Engagement with
the ICC and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conf.
(June 15, 2010).
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unlawful force that is disproportionate and not justified by military
necessity.
2. Unlawful Use of Force as a War Crime

Violators of jus ad bellum requirements seemingly can still walk
away scot-free unless certain practical solutions can be found in the
ICC Statute. A practical solution can be constructed from the current
international crimes over which the ICC has jurisdiction. The ICC
can exercise jurisdiction over the crime of genocide, crimes against
humanity, and war crimes.52 In the case of unlawful use of force that
is disproportionate and not justified by military necessity as a crime,
the closest link can be drawn to war crimes.
The ICC Statute distinguishes three categories of war crimes:
1)First, gave breaches under the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.
The statute merely repeats the definitions contained in the four
Geneva Conventions (Articles 50 of Geneva Convention I,53 51
of Geneva Convention II,54 130 of Geneva Convention III,55 and
147 of Geneva Convention IV.56)
2)The second category of war crimes covers other serious
violations of the laws of war and customs applicable in
international armed conflicts.57
3)The third category introduces serious violation of Article 3
common to the Geneva Conventions, which applies to noninternational armed conflicts. Common Article 3 includes a
prohibition of acts such as violence to life and person, in
particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture.
52.

ICC, supra note 36, at art. 5.

53.

Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, art. 50, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
75 U.N.T.S. 31.

54.

Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Conditions of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, art. 51, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 85.

55.

Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 130,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

56.

Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War, art. 147, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.

57.

These crimes are derived from various sources. They reproduce to a
large extent the rules from: the 1907 Hague Convention respecting the
Laws and Customs of War on Land Oct. 18, 1907, 2277 T.S. No. 539, 1
Bevans 631; Protocol I, supra note 33; the Hague Declaration (III)
Concerning Expanding Bullets, Sept. 4, 1900, 187 C.T.S. 459; Geneva
Gas Protocol, June 17, 1925, 94 L.N.T.S. 65, 26 U.S.T. 571-72.
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The selection of war crimes under the ICC Statute was based on
two criteria. First, whether the norm should be part of customary
international law, given that not all treaties of international
humanitarian law defining war crimes are universally accepted, and
second, whether the violation of the norm would give rise to
individual criminal responsibility under customary international law.58
The concern, therefore, in the current analysis is whether the illegal
use of force that is not proportional and which is not justified by
military necessity can be prosecuted as a war crime. Does the
disproportional use of force not justified by military necessity under
jus ad bellum qualify as a war crime?
We have already seen that the crime of aggression cannot
currently be prosecuted under the Rome Statute. What if an
aggressor uses force that is disproportionate and not justified by
military necessity—can the individuals who ordered such attacks be
found liable for war crimes? What about self-defending States that
retaliate with force that is disproportionate and not justified by
military necessity? Is the use of such force unlawful? And can
individuals who ordered such attacks be found liable for war crimes?
In any armed conflict, civilians are bound to be killed and injured,
and property is bound to be damaged or destroyed. In the endeavor
to protect non-combatants and civilians in any armed conflict, the law
must seek to balance the needs of humanity with the practical
inevitabilities of warfare.59 The prime example of such a balance is
found in Articles 51(5), 57(2) and 85(3)(b) and (c) of Additional
Protocol I.60 The prohibition here is of “excessive” incidental loss to
civilian life, which accepts by implication the occasional
unavoidability of incidental losses which are not “excessive.” While
this protection for civilian life is a fundamental principle in jus in
bello,61 the principle of proportionality regarding defensive attacks in
jus ad bellum is also aimed at the protection of human life.
Article 8(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute employs similar language to
Additional Protocol I when referring to war crimes:
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such
attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or
damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe
58.

Herman von Hebel & D. Robinson, Crimes within the Jurisdiction of the
Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE 392 (Roy S.K. Lee ed., 1999).

59.

Fenrick, supra note 25, at 98,

60.

Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 8(b)(iv).

61.

Michael Bothe, War Crimes, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 397 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 2002).
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damage to the natural environment which would be clearly
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military
advantage anticipated.

Since the language in the Rome Statute is specifically based on
the language in Additional Protocol I, it will always be necessary to
look back to Additional Protocol I for clarification on aspects of the
rule not specifically covered in the Rome Statute.62 While the analysis
in the Rome Statute can be conducted even on attacks under jus ad
bellum, the analysis under Additional Protocol I seems to be clearly
based on jus in bello.
This is one of the great points where a fusion can be constructed.
Attacks constructed by States as part of a war of aggression or in selfdefense should be analyzed under the strict requirements of the Rome
Statute on individual criminal responsibility. But since the origins of
such crimes are clearly from jus in bello a clear fusion emerges with
jus ad bellum. Such fusion is by all means desirable because it ensures
that the perpetrators of unlawful warfare get just desserts. This deters
others who might consider exploiting the gaping hole in the crime of
aggression as an advantage for committing war crimes.
The concerns here are: 1) what does it mean to “intentionally
launch an attack” with “the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life to civilians or damage to civilian objects” which
will be “excessive” in relation to the “concrete and direct overall
military advantage anticipated”, 2) would breaches of jus contra
bellum by military personnel when waging a war of aggression or in
self-defense fit into these broad categories of action?
The rules of treaty interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) are
important in answering these questions.63 Article 31(1) of the VCLT
provides: “[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” This
provision explains the first step of the interpretation process, that is,
priority should be given to the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s text.64
The second step requires that the interpretation proceed under the
“context” of the treaty. The term “context” should be understood to
automatically include the text of the treaty, the preamble, and
possible annexes. The preamble of the Rome Statute provides its
62.

Eric Jaworski, “Military Necessity” and “Civilian Immunity”: Where is
the Balance?, CHINESE J. INT’L L. 175, 187 (2003).

63.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 31 & 32, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.

64.

THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY
807 (Oliver Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
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object and purpose, which is “to put an end to impunity for the
perpetrators of international crimes and thus contribute to the
prevention of such crimes”. It is with this object and purpose that we
will endeavor to color Article 8(b)(iv) of the Rome Statute with
meaning.
Article 31 of the VCLT indicates that the context of a treaty
should include the preamble as well as the treaty itself. In addition,
the subsequent agreements, such as the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and the Elements of Crimes, are germane to interpretation.
Article 32 of the VCLT provides the drafting history, or travaux
préparatoires of the Statute, as supplementary means of
interpretation. for when the ordinary meaning in Article 31 is
ambiguous or obscure, or the general rule of interpretation leads to an
absurd or unreasonable result.65
Article 8(b)(iv) requires that in order for the war crime of
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity to be
committed, there has to be an “intentional launching of an attack.”
The fundamental question here remains, what is an “attack” within
the meaning of Article 8(b)(iv). The Rome Statute does not define
what an “attack” in Article 8 means, but when taken in context
especially in relation to Article 8(1), then such an attack has to be
large-scale. Therefore, the act of a single soldier shooting a rifle
cannot be considered an attack. The provision requires “intentional
launching.” Thus, intentionality should be considered the mens rea
element of the war crime of disproportionate use of force not justified
by military necessity. This element requires specific knowledge from
the perpetrator that such an attack would have excessive effects on
loss of civilian life.66
On September 8, 1944, the Germans launched a V2 rocket at
London, which was 14 meters (46ft) high and carried a ton (900 kg)
of explosives.67 The rocket gauged a crater 10 meters (32ft) across,
killing three people and injuring twenty-two. This can be seen as a
quintessential example of an attack intentionally launched with full
knowledge that it would cause excessive civilian casualties without
serving any advantageous military aim. The distinction here should
not be based on whether the analysis is based on jus in bello or jus ad
bellum. Nor should the analysis on proportionality be influenced on
65.

See WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 94 (2004) (discussing the drafting of the Rome
Statute).

66.

Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes, 256, ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Doc.
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (2011) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes].

67.

COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1997 TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 1958 (Yves Sandoz et al.
eds., 1987).
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these factors when seeking to ensure protection for civilians, in the
case where such an attack was self-defensive or one sanctioned by the
UN Security Council. This would mean that the individual who
ordered such an attack would be found culpable of the unlawful use of
force that is disproportionate and not justified by military necessity.
In late January of 1991, as the Gulf War was raging between Iraqi
forces led by Saddam Hussein and the UN-backed Gulf War coalition,
Saddam successfully launched scud missiles aboard mobile launchers
and initiated a series of attacks on Israel, Saudi Arabia, and
Bahrain.68 In terms of military necessity, these weapons were of lowaccuracy, low-reliability, and had little utility as counteroffensive
weapons. Within the first week of the attacks, Iraq launched twentysix missiles against Israel and although they caused relatively little
destruction, such attacks fulfill the mens rea requirement in Article
8(2)(b)(iv). If such a case is to be prosecuted before the ICC and the
number of civilian causalities is shown to be excessive, then it could
be very difficult for the perpetrator to disprove that the mental
element of the offense was present. This can fill in the lacunae left by
the non-prosecution of the international crime of aggression. In the
two examples cited above, it would also be impossible to claim that
civilian causalities were not the object of such attacks when the
missiles “due to their construction, could not be precisely directed at
a specific military target.”69
The second question under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is what is the
meaning of “excessive” as used to define the disproportionate use of
force not justified by military necessity. It should be remembered that
this analysis is done in relation to international armed conflicts as
required under the elements of crime.70 This augurs well with
constructing a fusion between jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the
context of prosecuting the war crime of unlawful use which is
disproportionate and justified by military necessity. Attacks on
civilian populations are clearly forbidden in the context of
international armed conflicts in jus in bello.71 It is clear that such
killing would be even more reprehensible in the context of aggression
under jus ad bellum since the primary principle is on the prohibition
of resort to armed force. In the case of self-defense, the
proportionality is measured as against the aggressive force used. In
both cases, from a strictly military point of view, collateral civilian
68.

See Sean McKnight, The Failure of the Iraqi Forces, in THE GULF WAR
ASSESSED 175 (John Pimlott & Stephen Badsey eds., 1992).

69.

Heike Spieker, Civilian Immunity, in CRIMES OF WAR: WHAT THE
PUBLIC SHOULD KNOW 84 (Roy Gutman & David Rieff eds., 1999).

70.

Elements of Crimes, supra 67 (quoting “The conduct took place in the
context of and was associated with an international armed conflict.”).

71.

Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 51(2).
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life must be lost. The question under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) is whether
such loss of civilian life is excessive as compared to the military
objective pursued. This analysis can be made in jus in bello
(immediate military goals) or in jus ad bellum (ultimate military),72 in
the analysis that Steenberghe refers to as the “general vs. particular
dichotomy.”73
What is “excessive” in a given scenario might seem very
subjective, but a few examples from the past can show that this is not
always the case. The raids in Dresden, London, Hiroshima, and
Nagasaki during World War II offer clear examples of situations that
would be considered excessive. While some commentators have argued
that this disproportionate use of force is what ended World War II,74
this is a very unsympathetic way of justifying unlawful use of force.
Under the strict requirements on proportionality in Article
8(2)(b)(iv), the fatalities witnessed in Hiroshima and Nagaski would
easily constitute “excessive” loss of life. That the United States is not
a State Party to the Rome Statute is an argument for another
occasion.75 It seems clear that the latter attacks by the Allies were not
carried out with proportionality and the protection of civilian lives as
a major factor in the planning stages. These would fulfill the
requirements on the elements of crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv).76
While our analysis of the crime of disproportionate use of force
not justified by military necessity has so far been based on
international armed conflicts, the vast number of current armed
conflicts are non-international. It is regrettable that Article
8(2)(b)(iv) would not apply to non-international armed conflicts. This
means certain attacks in the near past that have been criticized as
being disproportionate might not fall under the desirable fusion
between jus in bello and jus ad bellum in the context of the crime of
disproportionate use of force not justified by military necessity. This
is all the more disappointing when one considers recent Israeli attacks
in Gaza and the internal conflicts in Syria. ISIS in the Middle East is
another threat.

72.

Moussa, supra note 39, at 965.

73.

Van Steenberghe, supra note 35, at 115.

74.

See Seth Frantzman, A Short History of ‘Disproportionate Force’, SETH
J. FRANTZMAN (Jan. 22, 2009), available at
http://sethfrantzman.com/2009/01/22/a-short-history-ofdisproportionate-force/ [http://perma.cc/MW74-3L2M] (discussing
whether Israel used disproportionate force in response to Hamas).

75.

See Luke A. McLaurin, Can the President “Unsign” a Treaty? A
Constitutional Inquiry, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 94, 94 (2006).

76.

Jaworski, supra note 63, at 189.
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3. Constructing a Fusion: Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in relation to
Combatants and Civilians

The traditional theory of just war comprises two sets of
principles: one governs the resort to war (jus ad bellum) and the other
governs the conduct of war (jus in bello).77 It is perfectly possible, and
it has been argued, for a just war to be fought unjustly and for an
unjust war to be fought justly (in strict accordance with the rules).78
This therefore necessitates the use of neutral principles to find
culpability for combatants who contravene the rules of the just
conduct of war regardless of whether the war is just or unjust. This is
the “divergence” view, which posits that the two principles jus ad
bellum and jus in bello should not be considered in a way that
conflates the two because it would lead to absurd results.
The “convergence” view on the other hand requires that the
analysis of the conduct of combatants (jus in bello) be done in such a
way that would consider whether the war being fought is just or
unjust (jus ad bellum). The logical result would therefore be one
where if a war is considered unjust, the combatants fighting for the
unjust cause can be referred to as “unjust combatants” and thus even
if they were to kill legitimate combatants involved in the war, their
actions would not be justified under jus in bello. The consideration
here is that an “unjust combatant” fights for an unjust cause ab
initio. If a war is fought with just cause and maybe due to its
unnecessary or disproportionate nature the combatants in such a case
would be “just combatants.”79
Supporters of the divergence view find that it makes no difference
what kind of conduct unjust combatants display in war where they
fight without a just cause. Unjust combatants cannot be held
criminally liable for killing legitimate targets while involved in an
unjust war. They only are liable when they violate the principles of
jus ad bellum. Therefore, the moral position for both the unjust
combatant and the just combatant is indistinguishable. Walzer has
called this situation “the moral equality of soldiers.”80 The idea was
that international law had no option but to accept war, independent
of the justice of its origin, as relations between the relevant states and
to regulate it. Hence both parties are in equal position in legal terms.81

77.

These principles have been previously described in this essay.

78.

MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 21 (1977).

79.

Jeff McMahan, The Ethics of Killing in War, 114 ETHICS 693, 693
(2004).

80.

Walzer, supra note 79, at 34.

81.

WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 51 (1904).
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4. Distinguishing Combatants from Non-Combatants

Under jus in bello, combatants are members of the established
armed forces of a government who have a legal right to engage in
combat operations.82 This characterization seems quite easy to
decipher until one examines the realm of non-international armed
conflicts, which have increased in recent decades. With increased
number of non-international armed conflicts, members of dissident
forces, other organized armed groups, and militias are now taking part
in hostilities. Individuals in such groups do not enjoy the protection
accorded to civilians when they take a direct part in hostilities. They
are not, however, entitled to the rights accorded to combatants strictu
sensu.
Combatants enjoy “combatant immunity” under international
law, protecting them from prosecution for death or injury to person or
damage or destruction of property resulting from combatants acts
that otherwise comply with the law of war in armed conflict.83 A
combatant:
(i)Has the right to carry out lawful attacks on enemy military
personnel and military objectives;
(ii)Is at risk of attack by enemy military forces at any time,
wherever located, regardless of the duties or activities in which
he or she is engaged;
(iii) Bears no criminal responsibility:
(a). for killing or injuring;
1.enemy military personnel or
2.civilians taking a direct part in hostilities, or
(b). for causing damage or destruction to property
incidental to lawful military operations, provided his or her acts,
including the means employed to commit those acts, have been
in compliance with the law of war; and

If captured:
(i)Is entitled to prisoner of war status (POW),
82.

Protocol I, supra note 33, at art. 43(2); MODEL MANUAL ON THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT FOR ARMED FORCES (A.P. V. Rogers & P. Malherbe
eds., 1999). Under Customary IHL, all members of the armed forces of a
party to the conflict are combatants, except medical and religious
personnel.

83.

See U.S. v. Lindh, 212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 552-58 (E.D. Va. 2002) (holding
that the defendant was not entitled to lawful combatant immunity).
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(ii) May be detained indefinitely until cessation of active
hostilities,
(iii) Is entitled to humane treatment,
(iv) May be tried for violations of the law of war, and
(v)May only be punished for violations of the law of war as a
result of a fair and regular trial.84

The principle of distinction, which is one of the corner stones of
jus in bello, requires that all involved in the armed conflict distinguish
between combatants and civilians. Combatants must thus distinguish
themselves from civilians who don’t participate directly in hostilities
and so may not be attacked.85 This position exists independent of the
legality of the war. It has been suggested that the impact of the
legality of the war “would mean that the members of the aggressor’s
armed forces would not be entitled to the rights that legitimate
combatants would be entitled to or to be protected by other rules of
war.”86 But the jus in bello framework frowns upon this position.
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) protects the integrity and
dignity of the individuals whether they fight for the aggressor or its
victims.87 Common Article 2 and 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
captures this position clearly by stating that IHL is triggered by the
commencement of armed conflicts.
A civilian may convert himself into a combatant at any time
when the hostilities are taking place. As a matter of fact, every
combatant is a former civilian. Nobody is ever born a combatant,
everyone is born a civilian. In the same breadth, a combatant may
retire and become a civilian. But at any given point a person is either
a combatant or a civilian. An individual cannot (and is not allowed
to) be both at the same time, nor can he constantly shift from one
position to the other at the same time.88
It is clear that combatants, whichever side of the divide they are
on, have a moral and legal obligation to respect the in bello principles.
84.

W. Hays Parks, Combatants, 85 INT’L L. STUD. SERV. US NAVAL WAR C.
248, 261-262 (2009).

85.

Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 94, ¶¶ 73-87 (July 9).

86.

Christopher Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modern International
Law, 36 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 283, 289 (1987).
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Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Overlap and Convergence: The
Interaction Between Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 157, 160 (2007).

88.
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This is what has been referred to as their in bello responsibility. This
section addresses whether combatants can be held responsible for
participating in an unjust war or a war that is incompatible with ad
bellum principles. Do they, aside from their in bello responsibilities,
also have an ad bellum responsibility? This would place combatants in
a dilemma of having to gauge the justice of the war they are involved
in and refuse to fight if the conflict contravenes ad bellum principles
and whether they just have to follow orders regardless of the just or
injustice occasioned by the war.
5. Combatants’ in bello and ad bellum responsibility

A distinction has to be drawn between unlawful combatants
under jus bello and ad bellum principles. In jus ad bellum, the state of
unlawful combatancy, that philosopher Jeff McMahan calls “unjust
combatants,” starts with the status of the war. This term borrows
heavily from the just war theorists. According to the just war theory,
a war is not lawful unless it meets an ad bellum purpose. If the war
contravenes ad bellum (is not self-defense, defense of others, or
putting a stop to human rights violations), meaning that the
combatants are fighting a war of aggression, then all the actions taken
by the combatants should be illegal ab initio. In jus in bello, unlawful
combatants are individuals who engage in covert attempts at
combatancy and civilianhood at the same time. Persons engaging in
military raids at night, while purporting to be an innocent civilian by
day are neither civilians nor combatants: they are unlawful
combatants.89
The study of the legal and moral responsibility in warfare shows
that combatants cannot be held responsible for their ad bellum
violations.90 They can be held responsible for any kind of in bello
violation. Hence, this kind of responsibility is what ethicists have
called their “in bello responsibility.”91
According to the moral equality of a soldier’s position, it would
follow that jus in bello applies equally to all belligerents.92 This idea,
that jus in bello and jus ad bellum principles operate independently of
each other as we have already stated, is well developed in
international law.93 An example is found in the Iran-Iraq war. While it
89.
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is generally accepted that Iraq was the aggressor, Iraqi combatants
would still have the privileges accorded to legitimate combatants
when captured.94 They will have, for instance, the rights to prisoner of
war (POW) status. This view therefore construes belligerent status in
a way detached from the right to go to war in the first place.95
Another view maintains the moral equality of soldiers and justifies
the separation of the two bodies of law by asserting that an aggressor
in an aggressive war can enjoy the whole range of entitlements of
war.96 Lauterpacht, however, tends to disagree with this view; he
observes that before the emergence of the prohibition of war, all
belligerents, whatever the cause of their war, were subject to the same
laws of war. After the emergence of the prohibition of war, however,
there is no longer a legal right to war. Therefore, an illegal war “can
no longer confer upon the guilty belligerent all the rights which
traditional international law.”97 If this is the case, do combatants who
target “legitimate” targets commit blatant acts of murder? Can their
actions be justified under this view?
Such practical questions call for further analysis of the view that
jus in bello can operate unaffected by jus ad bellum. In terms of
combatant responsibility as autonomous individuals, the necessity for
such analysis becomes even more important. If we are to follow the
International Court of Justice Advisory opinion in the Nuclear
Weapons opinion; that a use of force that is proportionate under the
law of self-defense, must (in order to be lawful) also meet the
requirements of the law applicable in armed conflict which
compromise, in particular, the principles and rules of humanitarian
law.98 The concern here is for the development of a more convergent
view than the perpetuation of the divergent view.

II. Conclusion
There are many points of fusion and fission of jus ad bellum and
jus in bello in the body of the law of war. There has been controversy
over the application of the crime of disproportionate use of force not
justified by military necessity and whether certain categories of
actions can be prosecuted in the ICC when the analysis is based on
jus ad bellum. We have argued for more fusion in the context of
94.
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prosecuting the war crime of disproportionate use of force not justified
by military necessity. Nonetheless, we have argued for some fission
when it comes to the treatment of combatants and civilians under the
two bodies of law.
It should be remembered that the aim of international law under
the auspices of the United Nations is to ensure that there is
international peace and security. War in itself is prohibited and States
are encouraged to solve their differences through peaceful means.
However, the truth of recent times is very different, and armed
conflicts continue to reign supreme in most parts of the world. The
introduction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) to act as a
center for stopping the impunity that is perpetrated in armed conflicts
is greatly welcome. Whatever the outcome of the debate is between
jus in bello and jus ad bellum proponents regarding either the
separation or conflation of the two bodies, both sides should work
towards ensuring sustainable peace and security amongst States.
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